

Computer Networks 1 (Mạng Máy Tính 1)

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
Chapter 8

Network Security

Computer Networking: A Top Down Approach ,
5th edition.

Jim Kurose, Keith Ross

Addison-Wesley, April 2009.



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Chapter 8: Network Security

Chapter goals:

- ❑ understand principles of network security:
 - cryptography and its *many* uses beyond "confidentiality"
 - authentication
 - message integrity
- ❑ security in practice:
 - firewalls and intrusion detection systems
 - security in application, transport, network, link layers

Chapter 8 roadmap

8.1 What is network security?

8.2 Principles of cryptography

8.3 Message integrity

8.4 Securing e-mail

8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL

8.6 Network layer security: IPsec

8.7 Securing wireless LANs

8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS

What is network security?

Confidentiality: only sender, intended receiver should "understand" message contents

- sender encrypts message
- receiver decrypts message


Authentication: sender, receiver want to confirm identity of each other

Message integrity: sender, receiver want to ensure message not altered (in transit, or afterwards) without detection

Access and availability: services must be accessible and available to users

Friends and enemies: Alice, Bob, Trudy

- ❑ well-known in network security world
- ❑ Bob, Alice (lovers!) want to communicate "securely"
- ❑ Trudy (intruder) may intercept, delete, add messages



Who might Bob, Alice be?

- ❑ ... well, *real-life* Bobs and Alices!
- ❑ Web browser/server for electronic transactions (e.g., on-line purchases)
- ❑ on-line banking client/server
- ❑ DNS servers
- ❑ routers exchanging routing table updates
- ❑ other examples?

There are bad guys (and girls) out there!

Q: What can a “bad guy” do?

A: A lot! See section 1.6

- *eavesdrop*: intercept messages
- actively *insert* messages into connection
- *impersonation*: can fake (spoof) source address in packet (or any field in packet)
- *hijacking*: “take over” ongoing connection by removing sender or receiver, inserting himself in place
- *denial of service*: prevent service from being used by others (e.g., by overloading resources)

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
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The language of cryptography



m plaintext message


$K_A(m)$ ciphertext, encrypted with key K_A

$m = K_B(K_A(m))$

Types of Cryptography

- ❑ Crypto often uses keys:
 - Algorithm is known to everyone
 - Only "keys" are secret
- ❑ Public key cryptography
 - Involves the use of two keys
- ❑ Symmetric key cryptography
 - Involves the use one key
- ❑ Hash functions
 - Involves the use of no keys
 - Nothing secret: How can this be useful?

Symmetric key cryptography



symmetric key crypto: Bob and Alice share same (symmetric) key: K_S

□ e.g., key is knowing substitution pattern in mono alphabetic substitution cipher

Q: how do Bob and Alice agree on key value?

Symmetric key crypto: DES

DES: Data Encryption Standard

- ❑ US encryption standard [NIST 1993]
- ❑ 56-bit symmetric key, 64-bit plaintext input
- ❑ Block cipher with cipher block chaining
- ❑ How secure is DES?
 - DES Challenge: 56-bit-key-encrypted phrase decrypted (brute force) in less than a day
 - No known good analytic attack
- ❑ making DES more secure:
 - 3DES: encrypt 3 times with 3 different keys (actually encrypt, decrypt, encrypt)

AES: Advanced Encryption Standard

- ❑ new (Nov. 2001) symmetric-key NIST standard, replacing DES
- ❑ processes data in 128 bit blocks
- ❑ 128, 192, or 256 bit keys
- ❑ brute force decryption (try each key) taking 1 sec on DES, takes 149 trillion years for AES

Public Key Cryptography

symmetric key crypto


- ❑ requires sender, receiver know shared secret key
- ❑ Q: how to agree on key in first place (particularly if never "met")?

public key cryptography

- ❑ radically different approach [Diffie-Hellman76, RSA78]
- ❑ sender, receiver do *not* share secret key
- ❑ *public* encryption key known to *all*
- ❑ *private* decryption key known only to receiver



Public key cryptography



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
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Message Integrity

- ❑ Allows communicating parties to verify that received messages are authentic.
 - Content of message has not been altered
 - Source of message is who/what you think it is
 - Message has not been replayed
 - Sequence of messages is maintained
- ❑ Let's first talk about message digests

Message Digests

- ❑ Function $H()$ that takes as input an arbitrary length message and outputs a fixed-length string:
"message signature"
- ❑ Note that $H()$ is a many-to-1 function
- ❑ $H()$ is often called a "hash function"




- ❑ Desirable properties:
 - Easy to calculate
 - Irreversibility: Can't determine m from $H(m)$
 - Collision resistance: Computationally difficult to produce m and m' such that $H(m) = H(m')$
 - Seemingly random output

Hash Function Algorithms

- MD5 hash function widely used (RFC 1321)
 - computes 128-bit message digest in 4-step process.
- SHA-1 is also used.
 - US standard [NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1]
 - 160-bit message digest

Message Authentication Code (MAC)




- ❑ *Authenticates sender*
- ❑ *Verifies message integrity*
- ❑ No encryption !
- ❑ Also called "keyed hash"
- ❑ Notation: $MD_m = H(s || m)$; send $m || MD_m$

End-point authentication


- ❑ Want to be sure of the originator of the message - *end-point authentication*.
- ❑ Assuming Alice and Bob have a shared secret, will MAC provide end-point authentication.
 - We do know that Alice created the message.
 - But did she send it?

Playback attack

$MAC = f(msg, s)$



Defending against playback attack: nonce



Digital Signatures

Cryptographic technique analogous to handwritten signatures.

- ❑ sender (Bob) digitally signs document, establishing he is document owner/creator.
- ❑ Goal is similar to that of a MAC, except now use public-key cryptography
- ❑ **verifiable, nonforgeable**: recipient (Alice) can prove to someone that Bob, and no one else (including Alice), must have signed document


Digital Signatures

Simple digital signature for message m :

- Bob signs m by encrypting with his private key K_B^- , creating "signed" message, $K_B^-(m)$

Bob's message, m

Dear Alice
Oh, how I have missed
you. I think of you all the
time! ... (blah blah blah)
Bob

 K_B^- Bob's private
key


Public key
encryption
algorithm

$K_B^-(m)$


Bob's message,
 m , signed
(encrypted) with
his private key

Digital signature = signed message digest

Bob sends digitally signed message:



Alice verifies signature and integrity of digitally signed message:



Digital Signatures (more)

- Suppose Alice receives msg m , digital signature $K_B^-(m)$
- Alice verifies m signed by Bob by applying Bob's public key K_B^+ to $K_B^-(m)$ then checks $K_B^+(K_B^-(m)) = m$.
- If $K_B^+(K_B^-(m)) = m$, whoever signed m must have used Bob's private key.

Alice thus verifies that:

- ✓ Bob signed m .
- ✓ No one else signed m .
- ✓ Bob signed m and not m' .

Non-repudiation:

- ✓ Alice can take m , and signature $K_B^-(m)$ to court and prove that Bob signed m .


Public-key certification

❑ Motivation: Trudy plays pizza prank on Bob

- Trudy creates e-mail order:
Dear Pizza Store, Please deliver to me four pepperoni pizzas. Thank you, Bob
- Trudy signs order with her private key
- Trudy sends order to Pizza Store
- Trudy sends to Pizza Store her public key, but says it's Bob's public key.
- Pizza Store verifies signature; then delivers four pizzas to Bob.
- Bob doesn't even like Pepperoni


Certification Authorities

- ❑ **Certification authority (CA):** binds public key to particular entity, E.
- ❑ E (person, router) registers its public key with CA.
 - E provides "proof of identity" to CA.
 - CA creates certificate binding E to its public key.
 - certificate containing E's public key digitally signed by CA
 - CA says "this is E's public key"



Certification Authorities

- When Alice wants Bob's public key:
 - gets Bob's certificate (Bob or elsewhere).
 - apply CA's public key to Bob's certificate, get Bob's public key



Certificates: summary

- ❑ Primary standard X.509 (RFC 2459)
- ❑ Certificate contains:
 - Issuer name
 - Entity name, address, domain name, etc.
 - Entity's public key
 - Digital signature (signed with issuer's private key)
- ❑ Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI)
 - Certificates and certification authorities
 - Often considered "heavy"

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
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Secure e-mail

- Alice wants to send confidential e-mail, m , to Bob.




Alice:

- generates random *symmetric* private key, K_S .
- encrypts message with K_S (for efficiency)
- also encrypts K_S with Bob's public key.
- sends both $K_S(m)$ and $K_B(K_S)$ to Bob.

Secure e-mail

- Alice wants to send confidential e-mail, m , to Bob.




Bob:

- uses his private key to decrypt and recover K_S
- uses K_S to decrypt $K_S(m)$ to recover m

Secure e-mail (continued)


- Alice wants to provide sender authentication message integrity.



- Alice digitally signs message.
- sends both message (in the clear) and digital signature.

Secure e-mail (continued)

- Alice wants to provide secrecy, sender authentication, message integrity.



Alice uses three keys: her private key, Bob's public key, newly created symmetric key

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
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
SSL: Secure Sockets Layer

- ❑ Widely deployed security protocol
 - Supported by almost all browsers and web servers
 - https
 - Tens of billions \$ spent per year over SSL
- ❑ Originally designed by Netscape in 1993
- ❑ Number of variations:
 - TLS: transport layer security, RFC 2246
- ❑ Provides
 - Confidentiality
 - Integrity
 - Authentication
- ❑ Original goals:
 - Had Web e-commerce transactions in mind
 - Encryption (especially credit-card numbers)
 - Web-server authentication
 - Optional client authentication
 - Minimum hassle in doing business with new merchant
- ❑ Available to all TCP applications
 - Secure socket interface

SSL and TCP/IP




Normal Application



Application
with SSL

- SSL provides application programming interface (API) to applications
- C and Java SSL libraries/classes readily available

Could do something like PGP:



- But want to send byte streams & interactive data
- Want a set of secret keys for the entire connection
- Want certificate exchange part of protocol:
handshake phase

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
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Firewalls

firewall

isolates organization's internal net from larger Internet, allowing some packets to pass, blocking others.



Firewalls: Why

prevent denial of service attacks:

- SYN flooding: attacker establishes many bogus TCP connections, no resources left for "real" connections

prevent illegal modification/access of internal data.

- e.g., attacker replaces CIA's homepage with something else

allow only authorized access to inside network (set of authenticated users/hosts)

three types of firewalls:

- stateless packet filters
- stateful packet filters
- application gateways

Intrusion detection systems

□ packet filtering:


- operates on TCP/IP headers only
- no correlation check among sessions

□ *IDS: intrusion detection system*

- *deep packet inspection*: look at packet contents (e.g., check character strings in packet against database of known virus, attack strings)
- examine correlation among multiple packets
 - port scanning
 - network mapping
 - DoS attack

Intrusion detection systems

- multiple IDSs: different types of checking at different locations



Network Security (summary)

Basic techniques.....

- cryptography (symmetric and public)
- message integrity
- end-point authentication

.... used in many different security scenarios

- secure email
- secure transport (SSL)
- IP sec
- 802.11

Operational Security: firewalls and IDS